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not harmonised and the case-law is based on individual cases” 
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 1 
Summary 
Gambling is something that has existed in most cultures for centuries and it 
is a topic which is highly debated. Despite large parts of the world being in 
an economic crisis, the gambling sector continues to grow. With the aid of 
new technology the accessibility of gambling has increased immensely. This 
raises concern on how to regulate this delicate area, as gambling on the one 
hand is perceived as morally objectionable and socially harmful, yet on the 
other hand, gambling generates significant amounts of revenue.  
 
The EU has from an early point taken the approach that it is up to each 
Member State to decide the appropriate measures regarding to gambling to 
pursue set objectives. This discretion has led to a patchwork of regulations 
on the matter of gambling and especially regarding online gambling. The 
regulations still have to adhere to fundamental principles of EU law, which 
has been brought up in case law, yet the ECJ has given Member States a 
broad discretion in how to regulate gambling despite clear breaches of 
fundamental principles.  
 
Sweden has always had a restrictive stance towards gambling and has had a 
state controlled monopoly for gambling since the 13
th
 century. Questions 
could be raised whether the Swedish restrictive legislation is coherent with 
EU law. Case law reveals that the Swedish Courts have refrained from 
requesting a preliminary ruling up to the Sjöberg and Gerdin case, where the 
ECJ considered the Swedish legislation to be coherent in principle. The 
recent judgment where the criminal sanctions were ruled to be 
discriminative by the Supreme Court, has caused legal uncertainty. 
Riksrevisionen and the Swedish Government also raised concerns with parts 
of the current legislation. The urgent questions are: 1) What will a potential 
new legislation look like? 2) Can the Danish license system prove to be a 
suitable alternative for the legislator?  
 2 
Sammanfattning 
Spel och dobbel är något som har funnits i de flesta kulturer i århundraden 
och är ett ämne där åsikter och intressen går vida isär. Trots att stora delar 
av världen befinner sig i en finansiell kris, fortsätter spelmarknaden att växa. 
I takt med att den teknologiska utvecklingen ökar, ökar även 
tillgängligheten av spel. Den kraftiga tillväxten inom spelsektorn, ger 
upphov till frågan om hur en marknad som å ena sidan kan uppfattas som 
moraliskt förkastlig och förknippad med negativa sociala skadeverkningar, 
och å andra sidan genererar betydande intäkter, ska regleras. 
 
Redan från ett tidigt skede har EU haft förhållningssättet att det är upp till 
varje medlemsstat att avgöra hur Spel och Dobbel ska regleras, vilket har 
lett till ett ”lapptäcke” av olika lagstiftningar. De nationella lagstiftningarna 
måste följa de fundamentala principerna i EU-rätten, vilket har tagits upp i 
ett flertal rättsfall. ECJ har dock gett medlemsstaternas en bred möjlighet att 
göra en skönsmässig bedömning angående vad som är bäst för respektive 
land trots klara avvikelser från de fundamentala principerna inom EU. 
 
Sverige har alltid haft en restriktiv hållning gentemot spel och dobbel, som 
har varit kontrollerat genom ett statligt monopol sedan 1200-talet. Det kan 
ifrågasättas huruvida den svenska restriktiva lagstiftningen är förenlig med 
EU-rätten. De svenska domstolarna har undvikit att inhämta 
förhandsavgöranden innan Sjöberg och Gerdinfallet, där ECJ ansåg den 
svenska lagstiftningen i stort vara förenlig med EU-rätten. När Högsta 
domstolen senare dömde i samma fall ansågs straffpåföljderna i 
lagstiftningen vara diskriminerande, vilket får anses skapa rättsosäkerhet. 
Riksrevisionen och den svenska regeringen har framfört kritik mot delar av 
den nuvarande lagstiftningen.  De trängande frågorna är: 1) Hur skall en 
potentiell ny lagstiftning se ut? 2) Kan den danska licensmodellen ses som 
ett passande alternativ för lagstiftaren? 
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1 Introduction  
Gambling is heavily debated in most parts of the world today and it is a 
topic where the opinion is truly dispersed. This is partially due to the 
specific nature of the activity and partially due to the fact that gambling is 
an enormous market today. Despite large parts of the world being in an 
economic crisis, the gambling sector continues to grow utilizing the 
available technology. Especially the online gambling sector is growing and 
that is happening regardless whether state regulators and lawmakers like it 
or not. Gambling was earlier more of a national problem as each country 
could control its territory as they wished. However, today gambling is easily 
accessed for consumers online across national borders, which raises 
uncertainty regarding its size, scope and legal basis.  
 
Gambling, and especially online gambling with an average annual growth 
rate of 14.7%, presents the world with a dilemma on how to regulate an 
activity which on the one hand is perceived as morally objectionable and 
socially harmful, yet on the other hand generates significant amounts of 
revenue.
1
 In 2010, the global gambling market (online and offline) 
generated a gross gambling revenue of €275 billion, in which the EU had a 
market share of 29%. The online gambling market was estimated to be 
worth €23.28 billion and the EU share represented 45 %.2  
 
Sweden has a restrictive gambling legislation where only a few providers 
are allowed to offer their services.
 3
 Nevertheless, an estimated 150 foreign 
commercial providers are active on the market offering their gambling 
services via the internet. The number of players gambling with foreign 
                                                 
1
Van den Bogaert, “Money for nothing”: The case law of the EU Court of Justice on the 
Regulation of Gambling,  p. 1175. 
2
 SWD(2012) 345 final, Online gambling in the Internal Market, p. 19. 
3
 SFS 1994:100 § 9, Lotterilagen. 
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providers is growing from 3% in 2009 to 4.5% in 2010.
4
 The current 
legislation was introduced when gambling was mainly done through land-
based gambling premises. The evolution of gambling has thus caught the 
legislator off-guard and the question is not really if a new or reconstructed 
legislation will come, it is a matter of when it must appear. 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this essay is to discuss the Swedish gambling legislation in 
the light of EU Law and to discuss whether the new Danish Gambling 
legislation could serve as an example for a future Swedish Gambling 
legislation.  
 
Questions to be answered: 
 
 Is the Swedish Gambling legislation in breach of EU law? 
 Could the Danish legislative approach be a possible solution for 
Sweden? 
1.2 Limitations 
I have chosen to use the term “gambling” as opposed to “gaming” 
throughout the essay to avoid confusion. I have also decided not to describe 
the various forms of gambling in detail nor which of these forms is the most 
damaging. I have also chosen to present the route Denmark has taken in 
regard to regulating gambling. The Danish legislation itself will not be 
discussed in depth but rather the characteristics of the legislation and the 
criticism the legislation has received. This will enable a discussion on how a 
future Swedish legislation might look like in the light of EU Law. 
                                                 
4
 SWD(2012) 345 final, Online gambling in the Internal Market, p. 20. 
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1.3 Method 
I have chosen to use a traditional legal dogmatic method with preparatory 
work, case law and doctrine. I have also chosen to use articles within the 
subject to be able to conduct a more profound discussion and analysis. The 
case law serves to show how the approach towards gambling has shifted in 
the EU. The regulatory case study with Denmark is used to be able to 
conduct a more profound discussion on the future of Swedish Gambling 
legislation. 
1.4 Disposition 
To get a better understanding of what gambling is and how it has evolved, I 
will start by briefly describing the evolution of gambling. I will then move 
on to the EU framework where relevant parts of EU law are described. This 
section is, followed by EU case law relating to gambling. The case law 
uncovered is not complete, but attempts to discuss the most relevant cases. 
After the EU framework, I present the development of Swedish gambling 
legislation from yesterday, today and a potential future legislation. I will 
also describe Swedish cases relating to gambling. Regarding the case 
Sjöberg och Gerdin I have decided to place it in the Swedish case section 
rather than the European eventhough it is a case where the ECJ has ruled, 
the case is important for the discussion regarding a potential new Swedish 
gambling legislation. 
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2 The evolution of gambling 
In this chapter, I am going to go through the history of gambling, how it has 
evolved, what it looks like today and present the main dangers connected to 
gambling.  
2.1 History 
Gambling is something that has existed in most cultures for thousands of 
years, some even argue that gambling has been around nearly as long social 
life itself. Gambling has a wide spectrum, as it is possible to make a wager 
on almost anything. Making wagers on contests, both human and animal, 
has been a large part of gambling as well as different forms of lotteries. 
Gambling has evolved considerably over the centuries but in reality the 
actual complexity has not. The changes in gambling are mainly due to the 
technologies available in a given time and a given place.
5
 
 
Gambling was common among the ancient cultures of Babylonians, the 
Etruscans, the Romans, the Greeks and the Chinese
6
 and most of today’s 
modern gambling originates from the use of dice and cards.
7
 Through 
archaeological excavations in North and South America, Africa and the 
Orient, primitive four-sided gaming sticks have been found dating back to 
6000 BC.
8
 The evolution of pieces of bone, to ivory and stone cut pieces 
and finally machine made dices can serve as an example of how the 
complexity does not necessarily change.
9
  
 
                                                 
5
 Schwarts, Gambling, space, and time: shifting boundaries and cultures,  p.1.  
6
 Derevensky, Problem Gambling in Europe, p. xv.  
7
 Reith, The Age of Chance, p. 44.  
8
 Reith, The Age of Chance, p. 47  
9
 Schwarts, Gambling, space, and time: shifting boundaries and cultures,  p. 1.  
 9 
While the wealthy could afford to place bets, most people often had nothing 
to lose but their freedom. In their desperation to win, it was common to bet 
on their own freedom.
10
 During the Middle Ages attempts were made to 
suppress gambling. The Church condoned gambling with the fear of its 
negative effects.
11
  In the 17
th
 century, gambling became extremely popular 
and the awareness of its many problems became more apparent. English 
poet and writer Charles Cotton described gambling in 1674 as: 
 
“Gaming is an enchanting witchery, gotten betwixt idleness and avarice; An 
itching disease, that makes some scratch the head, whilst others, as if they, 
were bitten by a Tarantula, are laughing themselves to death[…]”12 
2.2 Gambling today  
During the last decade, the commercial development of the gambling market 
in Europe and the rest of the world has gone through drastic changes. The 
demand and the availability of gambling services have changed significantly 
since the 1990s with the introduction of internet, satellite TV and mobile 
phones.
13
 This development has led to bookmakers offering their services 
cross borders through the Internet, often without the permission from the 
relevant Member State.
14
  
 
Online gambling has the quickest growth within the gambling sector and it 
is predicted to continue to outpace the rest of the gambling market.
15
 Today 
almost 7 million Europeans gamble online.
16
 “Online gambling” can refer to 
a range of different gambling services and distribution channels. The 
                                                 
10
 Reith, The Age of Chance, p. 48. 
11
 Dunkley, Gambling : a social and moral problem in France, p. 37  
12
 Cotton, The Compleat Gamester, p. 1.  
13
 Riksrevisionen, RiR 2012:15, Staten på spelmarknaden – når man målen?,  p. 15.  
14
 Riksrevisionen, RiR 2012: 15, Staten på spelmarknaden – når man målen?, p. 23. 
15
 Gainsbury, Internet Gambling Current Research Findings and Implications, p. 7.  
16
 Barnier, Online Betting and Gambling in Europe: from 
Consultation to Action,  p.3. 
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definition covers a wide spectrum of gambling services like sports betting, 
casino, lotteries, services provided by charity organizations and non-profit 
organizations. However, there is no uniform definition amongst Member 
States and most even lack a definition.
17
 Member States and stakeholders 
stress that there is a need for a clear definition of gambling in which all 
forms of gambling are included.
18
 
 
The evolution within gambling is everywhere, for example when watching a 
football match you cannot miss the live odds on the TV screen. Most of this 
development may for the most part be benign, making it possible for people 
to place wagers on their favourite team. However, there are also several 
problems connected to this extreme development, with match fixing being 
one of the more serious. Corruption in Sport is nothing new and has always 
existed but the challenge our generation is facing is something completely 
different. The sport leagues around Asia have been heavily affected by 
match fixing.  As an example, the Malaysian Football League corruption 
was so common, that at one point an estimated 70 percent of the games were 
fixed. With the corruption so highly infested, the fans have turned their 
attention to leagues outside of Asia.
19
 However, it is not only the fans who 
have changed their allegiances, it is also the gamblers and those who engage 
in fraud by fixing matches. In Europe, intensive police investigation 
revealed that Asian betting syndicates had infiltrated the European market 
and fixed games by bribing officials and players.
20
  
 
Another major negative aspect of gambling is that it can be harmful if not 
enjoyed responsibly, from a financial, social and health perspective. When 
gambling becomes a problem there are several terms to describe this 
behavior and there is no clear definition, but the most common are: problem 
gambling, gambling addiction, compulsive gambling, excessive gambling 
                                                 
17
 SWD(2012) 345 final, Online gambling in the Internal Market, p. 6. 
18
 SWD(2012) 345 final, Online gambling in the Internal Market, p. 7. 
19
 Hill, Sports Betting: Law and Policy - The Revolution, p. 9-12. 
20
 Hill, Sports Betting: Law and Policy- The Revolution, p.12-13. 
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and pathological gambling.
 
Together with the fraud aspect, problem 
gambling (and consumer protection) is an used reason for many Member 
States having a restrictive policy connected to gambling.
21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 SWD(2012) 345 final, Online gambling in the Internal Market,  p. 19  
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3 European Framework  
In this chapter, a brief background to the EU is given followed by the most 
basic and relevant legal principles to better understand case law in chapter 
four. I am also going to go through the developments within the regulation 
of gambling in Europe, and how gambling is generally perceived.  
3.1 The core of the EU 
When Sweden entered the EU in January 1 1995, EU Law became binding 
for the Swedish state, but to a large extent also for its companies and 
citizens. EU Law should be applied directly by Courts and authorities and 
when there is a clash between the two, EU Law is superior to domestic 
law.
22
 The internal market seeks to enable the free movement of goods, 
capital, services and people, the so called “four freedoms” within EU’s 27 
member states.
23
 Free trade allows for specialization, which leads to a 
comparative advantage and which in its turn leads to economies of scale. 
This enables maximized welfare and utilization of the world’s 
resources.
24
All countries are unique with different kinds of resources, 
climate and workforce. These differences give each country a comparative 
advantage over the others with the same market. Trade between countries 
allows concentration on what they can do best. The individual advantages, 
between countries, translate into maximum productivity for all.
25
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon came in to force in December 2009. With this Treaty 
the three pillar structure, which had constituted the EU, fell. This means that 
it is now correct to talk of ‘Union’ Law instead of ‘Community’ Law when 
talking about the free movement principles. The free movement principles 
                                                 
22
 Bernitz, Europarättens grunder, p. 1. 
23
 Bernitz, Europarättens grunder, p. 187. 
24
 Barnard, The Substantive Law of Europe – The Four Freedoms, p. 3.  
25
 Barnard, The Substantive Law of Europe – The Four Freedoms, p. 4. 
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are now found within the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(all articles referred hereinafter are from the ‘TFEU’).26 
3.1.1 Legal Principles 
The ECJ often refers to legal principles as there is no complete 
harmonization within the EU. Therefore these legal principles serve as 
important tools in the interpretation of applicable law. When a derogation or 
a public-interest requirement has been identified and accepted by the 
national Court, it has to be determined whether the steps taken by the 
Member State were appropriate, are compatible with human rights and 
proportionate. The latter is, known as the principle of 
proportionality.
27
There are various formulations of the principle and due to 
the ECJ using more lenient versions of the proportionality test, it has caused 
uncertainty to what the principle actually encompasses. The proportionality 
issue raises two questions: are the measures suitable for securing the 
objective and does the measure go beyond what is necessary in the pursuit 
of attaining the objective?
28
 Regarding the suitability, it does not require a 
lot of control of the national legislation to attain the objective. However, the 
second question does require national Courts to evaluate whether the aim of 
the objective is achievable with other less restrictive means.
29
  
 
One of the cornerstones of the four freedoms is the principle of non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. It says that goods, persons, 
services and capital receive the same treatment as their in-state counter 
parts.
30
 
 
                                                 
26
 Lisbon Treaty, 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/how/evolution/article_7164_sv.htm. 
27
 Barnard, The Substantive Law of Europe – The Four Freedoms, p. 516. 
28
 See C-67/98 Zenatti, para. 29.  
29
 Barnard, The Substantive Law of Europe – The Four Freedoms p. 516. 
30
 Barnard, The Substantive Law of Europe – The Four Freedoms p. 18. 
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The principle of mutual recognition secures the free movement of services 
without the need for harmonization within the EU. If a service is provided 
legally in one Member State, it should not be prohibited from being 
provided in another Member State. This principle can be found in the 
Lisbon treaty and is also confirmed by Cassis de Dijon.
31
The only 
justification for an exception from this principle is an overriding general 
interest such as health, consumer or environment protection.
32
 
3.1.2 Freedom of Establishment and freedom to 
provide services 
The freedom of establishment is regulated in articles 49-55). Article 49 
states that restrictions to the freedom of establishment are not allowed. 
Article 49 enables primary and secondary establishments. When a company 
makes a primary establishment it is a question of a complete transfer of the 
registered seat from one member state to another.
33
 When referring to a 
secondary establishment it can be a company setting up branches, agencies 
or subsidiaries in another member state.
34
 
 
The freedom to provide services is regulated in Article 56-57. Article 56 can 
be used to challenge rules which obstruct the provision of services in the 
host state as well as the home state. Article 57 defines what a service is and 
applies the principle of equal treatment to the service provider.
35
 Articles 52 
and 62 allow Member States to derogate the freedom of establishment and 
the freedom to provide services on the grounds of public policy, public 
security and public health. However, these exceptions are meant to be used 
restrictively and the burden is placed on the national authorities and the 
                                                 
31
 Barnard, The Substantive Law of Europe – The Four Freedoms p. 624, see also C-120/78, 
Rewe-Zentral AG.  
32
 Europa.eu – mutual recognition 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/internal_market_general_framewo
rk/l21001b_en.htm 
33
 Bernitz, Europarättens grunder, p 275.  
34
 Barnard, The Substantive Law of Europe – The Four Freedoms p. 322. 
35
 Barnard, The Substantive Law of Europe – The Four Freedoms p. 356-358. 
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legislation also has to be proportionate.
36
The possibilities for Member States 
to maintain their discretion in regards to the freedom to provide services has 
developed through EU case law. The national legislation has to be 
applicable in a non-discriminatory manner, be justified in accordance with 
the public interest, be suitable for the pursuance of the aimed objective and 
not go beyond what is necessary to reach this objective and if these criteria, 
known as the Gebhard-test, are fulfilled the national legislation is deemed to 
be justified.
37
In theory, Articles 49 and 52 allow cross-border movement of 
gambling service providers within the internal market and Article 56 
similarly secures the movement of gambling services. The difference 
between the two freedoms is not clear and it has been up to the Court to 
provide guidance.
38
 
3.1.3 Competition Law and State monopolies 
Article 101 prohibits limiting competitive measures which may affect trade 
between Member States, while article 102 prohibits the abuse of a dominant 
position. Article 106.1 prohibits Member States from enacting or 
maintaining any measure in force in the case of public, undertakings which 
have been granted exclusive or special rights. The article only concerns 
activities of economic nature. It can be difficult to decide whether an 
activity is economic or non-economic. Gambling is, however, clearly of an 
economic nature. State trade monopolies are given an exception, according 
to Article 106.2 when a Member state considers a measure important 
enough to safeguard the activity in the interest of the general public.
39
 
                                                 
36
 C-260/04, para 33. Commission v. Italy.  
37
 C-55/94, para. 6 and  37, Gebhard.  
38
 Littler, In the Shadow of Luxembourg – EU and National Developments in the Regulation 
of Gambling, p. 15-17. 
39
 Faull, The EC law of competition, p.  279-280 
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3.2 Gambling development in the EU 
During the UK presidency of 1992 and the Edinburgh European Council 
meetings, the Commission decided that they would not continue with 
proposals for a harmonization regulation of gambling.
40
Gambling was 
considered as unsuitable for Community legislation and was therefore 
entrusted upon National legislation.
41
 Gambling services are however 
subject to two sets of directives in the EU. The first group consists of the  
Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the e-commerce Directive and the 
Service directive, which all clearly mention that gambling, should be 
excluded from the scope of the directives.
42
 Gambling has however not been 
defined and instead the term “games of chance” is used.43 This is the long-
standing definition used for gambling and found in its most recent form 
from 2010 in the Audiovisual Media Service Directive: 
 
“Games of chance involving a stake representing a sum of money, including 
lotteries, betting and other forms of gambling services”44 
 
The second group of directives consists of: the notification Directive, the 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the Directive on the common system 
of value added tax, has a larger impact on gambling services by providing 
the Member States on whose territory gambling services are offered to their 
                                                 
40
 DOC/92/8, European council in Edinburgh conclusions of the presidency, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-92-8_en.htm?locale=en 
41
 Kaburakis, EU Law, Gambling, and Sport Betting. European Court of Justice 
Jurisprudence, Member States Case Law, and Policy, p. 31. 
42
 Littler, In the Shadow of Luxembourg – EU and National Developments in the Regulation 
of Gambling, p. 112-113, see also see also SWD(2012) 345 final, Online gambling in the 
Internal Market, p. 15. 
43
 C-275/92, Schindler.  
44
 Audiovisual Media Services (AMS) Directive, 2010/13/EU, see also SWD(2012) 345 
final, Online gambling in the Internal Market, p. 15. 
 17 
consumers, with supervisory and taxation competence.
45
As chapter four will 
show, there is a clear reluctance from the ECJ to step in and judicially 
regulate gambling despite its part of the internal market. Considering the 
specific nature of gambling it can be argued that gambling is better handled 
through a political and legislative response. With the ECJ having difficulty 
to apply the standard internal market rules to gambling
46
 and the subsequent 
lack of interest of harmonization amongst most Member States, gambling 
services have been regulated in very different ways. Several states have 
banned gambling services, by establishing a monopoly or by issuing 
licenses for these services. There are also a few Member States without any 
specific legislation on gambling: 
 
 Ban  -  Offering gambling services on the internet is prohibited (Germany, 
The Netherlands) 
 Monopoly – Gambling services are either controlled by the state or by a 
private operator (Sweden, Finland, Portugal) 
 Licensing   - Providers who have received a license, by the state, can 
provide gambling services (Denmark, France, Italy) 
 No specific regulation – Very few rules connected to online gambling 
(Ireland, Lithuania)
47
 
 
With the recent developments of online gambling in the EU the European 
Commission has made no secret that greater clarity is needed.  The 
European Commission therefore adopted the Communication Towards a 
comprehensive European framework on online gambling on October 23th 
2012. The purpose of this Communication is to enhance clarity at EU and 
national level for the benefit of national authorities, bookmakers, consumers 
and any related industry such as payment or media service. The focus is on 
                                                 
45
 Littler, In the Shadow of Luxembourg – EU and National Developments in the Regulation 
of Gambling,  p. 113-114, see also see also SWD(2012) 345 final, Online gambling in the 
Internal Market, p. 15. 
46
 Van Den Bogaert, “Money for nothing”: The case law of the EU Court of Justice on the 
Regulation of Gambling, p. 1176. 
47
 SWD(2012) 345 final, Online gambling in the Internal Market, p. 19. 
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five areas: compliance of national regulatory frameworks with EU law, 
enhancing administrative cooperation and efficient enforcement, protecting 
consumers and citizens, minors and vulnerable groups, preventing fraud and 
money laundering and safeguarding the integrity of sports and preventing 
match fixing
48
 
                                                 
48
 SWD(2012) 345 final, Online gambling in the Internal Market, p. 2-3. 
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4 European Case Law on 
Gambling 
In this chapter, I am going to discuss important gambling case law 
chronologically from Schindler in 1992 to OPAP in 2012. The first three 
cases represent the early case law where the market looked very different 
compared to today. Through the rulings in Gambelli and Placanica the ECJ 
seemed to try to open up the market. However, in Liga Portuguesa the ECJ 
takes a u-turn and again places the regulatory responsibility on the Member 
States and recent case law has shown the same pattern. 
4.1 Case Study Schindler: C-275/92 
The case was about a UK legislation prohibiting all import of commercials 
for foreign lotteries. The Schindlers argued that the legislation was 
incoherent with EU law as it was an anti-competitive measure designed to 
protect the National Lottery’s monopoly.49  
4.1.1 Ruling 
Some Member States advocated that gambling was not an economic activity 
and thus preventing the ECJ to inquire whether national restrictions were 
against EC-law.  The ECJ decided that gambling, this time in form of 
lotteries, were deemed to constitute a service.
50
 However, the ECJ said that 
it was not possible to disregard the moral, religious or cultural aspects of 
gambling in the Member States. The general opinion of the Member States 
at the time was to restrict, or even prohibit, gambling for private providers. 
The ECJ also said that there was a high risk of crime and fraud connected to 
gambling, due to the scale of the stakes and winnings. The incitement to 
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spend was also a concern of the ECJ as it may have damaging individual 
and social consequences. The ECJ concluded by saying that contributions to 
the benefit of public interests such as charitable works, sports or culture 
could not be disregarded despite not being regarded as an objective 
justification.
51
 The UK legislation was deemed to be justified as it was in 
the interest of the public.
52
 
 
The Schindler-case is interesting as it was the first time that the ECJ 
concluded that gambling constituted an economical activity in the light of 
the treaty.  The ECJ also decided that gambling activities should be seen as 
a service. The ruling can be seen as the first step towards including 
gambling activities within the four freedoms and therefore also within the 
discrimination test and proportionality test, respectively. The ruling was 
partially founded on the risks connected to gambling but most likely it was 
also connected to the fact that gambling was quite insignificant in the inner 
market.
53
 The Schindler ruling is also interesting as the ECJ passed over the 
argument that the ban was discriminatory and how the Court used the rule of 
reason to expand the list of general interests to solely for public interests and 
that the Court refused to engage in a proportionality test.
54
   
4.2 Case Study Zenatti: C-67/98 
This case was regarding Italian gambling legislation which gave certain 
providers licenses to provide gambling services. The applicants for such 
licenses would have to pay certain levies and to comply with set guidelines 
on management of gambling activity. Zenatti acted as an intermediary in 
Italy for a UK company, without a license, which was illegal according to 
the Italian legislation.
55
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4.2.1 Ruling 
The ECJ stated that a legislation which restricts the freedom to provide 
gambling services are compatible with EU law if they are imposed as a part of a 
consistent and proportionate national policy to reduce the negative individual 
and social effects of gambling. Financing of social activities through, as in this 
case, only should constitute an incidental beneficial consequence. The ruling in 
Zenatti is clearer than previous judgments, by pointing out that the actual 
purpose of a justified legislation must be to reduce gambling. Benefitting the 
public can not be the primary objective.56   
4.3 Case Study Gambelli: C-243/01 
Piergiorgio Gambelli and 137 others took bets from Italians to the United 
Kingdom licensed bookmaker Stanley International Betting Ltd’s (hereafter 
Stanley) via the internet. In Italy this sort of business was exclusive for the 
state or for operators which had been approved by the state. Gambelli 
claimed that the Italian legislation was incompatible with the freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services. The defendants also argued 
that the principle of mutual recognition was overlooked and found it strange 
that despite having a valid license, they were treated as a company without 
any license. The case was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling by the 
Italian Court.
57
 
4.3.1 Ruling 
The ECJ stated that the Italian legislation constituted a restriction on the 
freedom of establishment and on the freedom to provide services. However, 
the ECJ continued saying that there is a possibility that such restrictions can 
be acceptable as exceptional measures or justified in accordance to case-law 
of the Court.  The Court reiterated what had been said in Zenatti, that the 
measures must have the primary objective to reduce gambling opportunities 
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and provide revenue to the state. The Court took it a bit further than in 
Zenatti by stating that the measures taken must stand in proportion and must 
be applied in a non-discriminatory matter. The ECJ also sharpens the tone in 
regard to state monopolies and say that if a Member State incites and 
encourages consumers to engage in various kinds of gambling in purpose of 
revenue, the authorities in that Member State cannot use the public order 
argument in order to justify restrictive measures. The Italian legislation 
prevented capital companies quoted on regulated markets from obtaining 
gambling service licenses on the grounds of avoiding licensees being 
involved in criminal or fraudulent activities. The EJC said that this could be 
considered a measure which goes beyond what is necessary, as there are 
other ways of checking the accounts and activities of such companies.
 58
  
The ECJ established a step-by-step reasoning 
 
1. Is there a restriction of freedom under the treaty? If so 
2. Is the restriction justified according to public interests? If so 
3. Is the restriction proportionate? 
 
Before the Gambelli ruling there was more focus on step one and two whereas 
the ECJ shifts focus to the proportionality test.
 59
  
Following this judgment the European Commission noted that gambling 
regulation might be needed as it is an area which causes significant Internal 
Market problems. The Commission said that it would examine whether 
there is a need for and the potential scope of a possible new EU initiative, 
based on the received complaints regarding cross-border gambling 
activities.
60
 This stance suggested that the borderless nature of online 
gambling services requires a European regulatory framework. Such a 
framework could seek to harmonize consumer protection but at the same 
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time let Member States, to a certain degree, still enjoy discretion in 
determining the measures needed.
61
  
4.4 Case Study Placanica: C-338/04, C-359/04 
and C-360/04 
The Placanica case also concerns Italian legislation. Again, UK bookmaker 
Stanley Leisure plc and three Italian providers, Placanica, Palazzese and 
Sorrichio were charged with organizing bet collection without the required 
police authorization. However, it was not possible for the defendants to 
obtain this authorization.
62
  
4.4.1 Ruling 
The ruling in Placanica reinforced what had been said in the Gambelli 
ruling. In previous case law the ECJ looked at the combination of aims to 
the legislation. The ECJ takes a different approach in the Placanica case by 
drawing a distinction between the different objectives set by the Member 
States. In this case the objective of reducing gambling opportunities was not 
deemed to hold due to the Italian legislature pursuing increased tax revenues 
from an expansion in the gambling sector. The second type of objective was 
the prevention of crime and fraud which was considered to be the true 
objective of the Italian legislation. The ECJ acknowledge that this objective 
could be seen as a justification as it attempted to represent a reliable, but at 
the same time attractive, alternative to clandestine gambling.  However, the 
Court said that the procedure on how licenses were awarded went well 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective and therefore the 
legislation was an infringement of Articles 49 and 56. The Court also made 
it clear that a Member State cannot apply criminal sanctions for the 
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providers without a license, which was impossible to obtain, as this 
constitutes a breach of EU law.
63
 
 
It is clear that the ECJ used a more stringent assessment regarding the 
national discretion compared to what was previously said in Schindler. If a 
Member State uses a multiple-license system, as in this case, the criteria, for 
a restrictive measure to be deemed proportionate, are higher. The principle 
of mutual recognition may not have been used directly by the ECJ but the 
fact that a provider is licensed in another Member State clearly had an 
influence in the proportionality test taken.
64
  
4.5 Case study Liga Portuguesa: C-42/07 
In 2005 Bwin, an Austrian gambling service provider, and the Portoguese 
professional football league, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional, 
entered a sponsorship agreement. This was problematic as offering 
gambling products is prohibited in Portugal without a license from the State 
of Portugal. Gambling in Portugal is solely entrusted upon Santa Casa da 
Misericordia de Lisboa, hereinafter “Santa Casa”, and the monopoly also 
includes the exclusivity to offer gambling products online. Santa Casa and 
other public interest institutions are entitled to all of the revenue generate 
from gambling. Santa Casa subsequently fined the league and Bwin for 
organizing and advertising online gambling. The league and Bwin 
challenged this decision before the Portuguese Court, Tribunal de Pequena 
Instancia Criminal do Porto.  The Court requested a preliminary ruling 
regarding the compatibility of the Portuguese legislation with the free 
movement rights of a company like Bwin. Bwin was legally established and 
licensed in other member states.
65
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4.5.1 Ruling 
When the judgement in Liga Portuguesa came in 2009 it sent shockwaves 
in the private gambling sector around Europe, as there was belief that the 
restrictive policies and monopolies would be challenged.
66
 The ECJ go back 
to the earlier case law by granting a general discretionary margin to regulate 
gambling. The Court also states that this margin depends on the dubious and 
disputed nature of gambling and not on any specific ground of justification. 
The Member states are free to set the objectives of their gambling legislation 
and to define how this should be met. These restrictions must meet the 
proportionality condition set in ECJ case law.
67
   
 
Advocate General Bot argued that the purpose of the fundamental freedoms 
never was not to create an open market for gambling. The Advocate General 
based this reasoning on the fact that gambling never was envisioned as part 
of the common market by the treaty. Advocate Bot states that competition 
normally creates benefits for the consumer in terms of better products and 
services.  However, as the business thrives on players losing more money 
than they win these advantages are not present when it comes to gambling. 
Competition in the gambling field would lead to a race in which the one 
who can offer the most attractive games in order to make bigger profit, 
wins.
68
  
 
The EJC declared that the fight against crime may constitute an overriding 
reason in the public interest. Gambling involves a high risk of crime or 
fraud which constitutes that the restrictions in respect of operators offering 
gambling services can be justified. The ECJ also points at Santa Casa’s 
reliability as they existed for a long time and that Santa Casa operates under 
strict control. This enables the state to safeguard that the rules for ensuring 
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fairness in the gambling sector are provided by Santa Casa. Regarding the 
applicability of the principle of mutual recognition which was brought up in 
the Gambelli and Placanica case, the discussion was put to an end with this 
judgment. The ECJ clearly said that a license in one Member State will not 
help the provider to obtain a license in a Member State with a legitimate 
monopoly active. In this case the ECJ also said that as there is no direct 
contact between the consumer and the provider, service is provided online, 
there is a different and more substantial risk of fraud for the customers. The 
Court also said that sponsoring by a gambling provider, on a sporting event 
or participating teams, may influence the sporting outcome directly or 
indirectly, with the incitement to increase profits.
69
  For these three reasons 
the Court subsequently ruled in the favor of Santa Casa stating that a 
restrictive legislation, like the one in this case, is not precluded within the 
means of article 56.
70
 
 
The judgment has to be considered clear regarding that gambling is an 
activity with moral, religious and culture predicaments which is seen with a 
dispersed approach among the Member States. Together with the fact that 
there is no harmonized EU-level approach, it is up to the Member States to 
regulate gambling, as in this case prohibiting the online provision of 
gambling services from a foreign provider.
71
 This ruling subsequently 
suggests that Members States who wish to retain their monopoly clearly 
have the ECJ on their side.
72
  
 
The Court acknowledges the fact that the Portuguese state does not have the 
same possibility to control foreign providers as they can with Santa Casa.
73
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However, it does not discuss the increasingly important tendering questions 
despite the fact that Santa Casa has, without competition, controlled 
gambling since 1783. The Court also made a more lenient interpretation 
when determining the underlying aim of the contested national measure, by 
signaling out the fight against crime, and thus leaves the strict approach 
established in Placanica. The more lenient approach continues in regard to 
the proportionality issue which has prompted questions from the private 
gambling sector if the legislation truly achieves its goals in consistent and 
systematic manner, who has to prove that and the role of mutual recognition 
in this context.
74
The rejection of the mutual recognition principle suggests 
the end of “the race to bottom” as the ruling implies that an operator must 
apply for a license in every Member State. It is questionable if this truly is 
desirable as it clearly renders the free movement principles as illusionary if 
a provider is subject to a license procedure in each Member State.  
 
However, the actual implications for the providers have not been as bad as 
this ruling would suggest as providers are still offering their services cross-
border without a license. The ruling also does not provide a definitive 
answer to all specific restrictions, it only answers that a license in one 
Member State does not automatically imply a license in another Member 
State.
75
   
4.6 Case Study Betfair: C-203/08  
In the Netherlands gambling legislation is based on a license system. The 
legislation prohibits the organization or promotion of gambling without a 
license. The licensed had been divided between a non-profit “De Lotto” and 
US-based Scientific Games Racing. Betfair is a gambling service provider 
licensed in the UK and Malta which solely provides its services to their 
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customers online or via telephone. In this case Betfair did not have any 
office or sales outlet in the Netherlands. Betfair offered their services in the 
Netherlands and enquired whether there was a need for a license to continue 
doing so. The application was denied and Betfair subsequently appealed this 
decision and also the fact that renewal of licenses granted to De Lotto and 
Scientific Games Racing, without letting other potentially interested parties 
know.
76
 The Dutch asked for a preliminary ruling from the ECJ with three 
questions: 1) If a closed licensing system, as the Dutch, is allowed, 
according to  article 56,  to prohibit a service provider, licensed in another 
Member State, to offer gambling services online in the Netherlands?  2) Are 
the principles of equality and transparency applicable within the context of 
Article 56 to the procedure for granting licenses in a statutorily established 
single-license system? 3) Can the extension of current licenses, without 
common knowledge, be considered suitable and proportionate for 
justification of the freedom to provide services? 
77
 
4.6.1 Ruling 
The issue of competitive tendering did not play a prominent role in the Liga 
Portuguesa case, as discussed above. In the Betfair case however it did and 
the ECJ identified three distinct restrictions on fundamental freedoms.
78
 The 
ECJ reiterated what had been said about mutual recognition in Liga 
Portuguesa and said that Betfair’s license obtained in another Member State 
is not a sufficient assurance that national consumers will be protected 
against crime and fraud, especially in the view of the lack of direct contact 
between consumer and provider. For the first question the Court said that a 
Member State can choose a single-provider licensing system as it is up to 
the states to determine the level protection sought. However, even if a 
Member State is allowed to choose such a system the national authorities 
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cannot act with such discretion so that the freedom of providing services 
loses its purpose.
79
  
 
Advocate General Bot stressed the importance of distinguishing the effects 
of competition in the gambling market from the effects of a tender call for 
the award of the license in question. The effects of competition in an open 
market is that the providers will try to have the most attractive offers. This 
may in turn lead a consumer to spend more money with an increased risk of 
gambling addiction. This would not be the case at the stage of granting a 
license.
80
 Despite what the Advocate General said the Court ruled that the 
measures taken were proportionate in relation to the set objective to extend 
an exclusive license without tender competition. If the license is granted to a 
public or private provider the activities would be subject to strict control by 
the public authorities. However, the ECJ let the Dutch Court decide whether 
the current licensees fulfilled these criteria.
81
 The Dutch Court later ruled 
that the licensees did not fulfill these criteria and that therefore the licenses 
should not have been renewed without opening up the procedure to 
competition.
82
 
4.7 Case Study Markus Stoß: C-316/07 
Mr. Stoß, Mr. Avalon and Mr. Happel had commercial premises in 
Germany where they offered sports betting on behalf of Happybet 
Sportwetten GmbH and Happy Bet Ltd. Both these companies had licenses 
awarded in the region Carinthia and in the UK respectively. The group was 
on two separate dates, ordered by police authorities to refrain from 
promoting and concluding sports betting on the grounds that no 
authorization from the Land Hessen was in place. The group appealed the 
decision and the Court asked for a preliminary ruling from the ECJ 
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concerning two questions: 1) Whether a monopoly on sports-betting is 
precluded from article 49 and 56 when other forms of gambling, with a 
higher potential addiction rate, are permitted to be offered by private 
providers?  2) Does a provider with a license in one Member State need to 
obtain further authorization in another Member State to offer their services 
in that Member State?
83
  
4.7.1 Ruling 
Member States are entitled to discretion regarding their gambling legislation 
and the restrictive measures in place must satisfy the conditions in regard to 
proportionality. However, the Court said that in order to justify a monopoly 
on gambling, as in this case, it is not necessary for the state to prove the 
proportionality of the measure taken.
84
 
The first question is answered with the fact that the regulation of sports-
betting is inconsistent and therefore incompatible with Union Law, based on 
the so called “hypocrisy test”, as it was a fact that the marketing by the 
monopoly was at times intense. The Court referred back to Placanica and 
state that it may be justified and it also states that it would be unrealistic to 
expect monopolies not to promote their services.
85
  In the second question 
referred, the Court reiterated what earlier case law had said that the EU Law 
does not oblige Member States to mutually recognize national gambling 
licenses.
86
 
Advocate General Mengozzi said the following about the regulation of 
gambling within the internal Market,  
“An industry worth thousands of millions of euros involving a harmful and 
culturally sensitive activity. A service which, thanks to new means of 
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communication, finds it easy to cross frontiers. A sector for which the law is 
not harmonised and the case-law is based on individual cases.”87 
 
In the aftermath of this statement, further light is cast upon the debate as to 
how the national competence to regulate gambling should be balanced. The 
clear aim of the debate is how to remove the discretion Member States have 
to regulate gambling whilst respecting the supremacy of the freedom to 
supply services and the freedom of establishment. If the freedom to supply 
services and the freedom of establishment are to be negated from the 
regulation of gambling services and gambling service providers, it could 
create a precedent which could prove harmful to the internal market within 
the EU.
88
  
 
4.8 Case study Garkalns: C-470/11 
Mr Garkalns applied to the authorities for a license to open an amusement 
arcade in a shopping centre in Riga, Latvia. The application was denied on 
the grounds to prevent the public from being tempted to favor gambling 
over other leisure opportunities. Mr. Garkalns appealed the decision and 
eferred to Betfair. As although the Latvian state may exercise its discretion 
on the regulation of gambling, the legislation has to be based objective, non-
discriminatory reasons which are announced in advance. The Latvian Court 
acknowledged the fact that the wording of the legislation might be 
inconsistent with the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of 
transparency.  The case was subsequently referred for a preliminary ruling.
89
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4.8.1 Ruling 
The ECJ confirmed the Garkaln claim that restrictions must be based on 
objective and non-discriminatory criteria and known in advance. The Court 
also said that it is essential that the authorities make their decisions 
accessible to the public.  The legislation has to genuinely meet the concern 
to reduce gambling opportunities in a consistent and systematic manner. The 
national Court is obliged to verify that the state strictly supervises the 
activities related to gambling, that restrictions aim to pursue the declared 
objective of the legislation and that the specific criterion in this case is 
applied without discrimination.
90
 
The EGBA, which represents the major providers of the gambling sector, 
has welcomed this ruling as it, in their opinion, confirms that Member States 
must announce draft gambling legislation in advance to the relevant 
providers for the legislation to be enforced. The EGBA also welcomed the 
Court’s stance regarding that restrictions to the market are only justified 
subject to strict conditions.
91
 
4.9 Case study OPAP: C-186/11 and 209/11 
This case is about the three UK licensed gambling service providers 
Stanleybet, William Hill and Sportingbet applying for licenses in Greece. 
When the Greek authorities had tacitly declined the applications and the 
three providers subsequently lodged an appeal to the Court. The Greek 
authorities based their decision on the fact that Greek gambling service 
provider OPAP had exclusive rights to offer gambling services until 2020. 
The Greek state had previously been the major shareholder in OPAP but had 
reduced its ownership to 34%.
92
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4.9.1 Ruling 
Advocate General Mazak repeated what had been said in previous case law, 
that a Monopoly may be justified if the legislation pursues the objective of 
restricting the availability of gambling services or reducing criminality 
related to gambling. The monopoly should be seen as a safe and controlled 
alternative. The restrictions should truly reflect the desire to reach the set 
objectives in a consistent and systematic manner. However, the Court took 
the view that the monopoly could not be deemed to meet these criteria, in 
meeting the objection of reducing gambling opportunities, as OPAP seems 
to employ an expansionist commercial policy and the exclusive right has 
lead to an increased supply of games of chance. Mazak, continued that if 
combating crime and fraud should be considered the primary objective of 
the legislation, it could only be seen as consistent if there was an actual 
problem of criminal activity significantly related to gambling in Greece and 
this link could be dealt by an expansion of authorized and regulated 
gambling activities.
93
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5 Swedish Framework 
In this chapter, I will briefly describe the development of gambling 
regulation in Sweden and what gambling in Sweden looks like today. I will 
also present preparatory works towards a potential new gambling 
legislation.  
5.1 Background 
Sweden has a longstanding tradition of strong state authority and the same 
applies to gambling. Already in Gutalagarna dating back to 1220 gambling 
was prohibited. In Magnus Erikssons stadslag from 1350 excessive 
gambling was prohibited. At the end of the 15
th
 century, playing cards came 
to Sweden, the oldest cards were found in Lund Cathedral. This prompted 
more legislation in 1520 when gambling with cards was prohibited.
94
  
 
During the 18
th
 century, the first lotteries in Sweden are organized. The 
lotteries were subject to approval by the king. Many cities and authorities 
realized that lotteries were a good way of financing different projects but 
also wars, like the Pomeranian War.
95
 The benefits of the lotteries led to 
prohibitions against foreign lotteries and lotteries with a commercial 
interest.
96
 Regulation continued with legislation adopted in 1844, which 
continued to suppress the influence of foreign lotteries. In 1939 the first 
complete and general regulation, “Lotteriförordningen” was adopted and it 
is considered to be the cornerstone in Sweden’s current legislation. The 
legislation from1939 was replaced 1982 by the Lottery Act and which in its 
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turn was replaced by the current legislation, the Lottery Act 1994 and the 
Casino Act.
97
  
5.2 Gambling in Sweden today 
Studies by the Swedish National Institute of Public Health from 2010, 
estimated that 73 percent of the Swedish population, in the ages 16-84, 
gamble at least once a year. When the same study was done in 1998 the 
percentage was 88 percent.
98
 However, it should be noted that the study 
from 1998 excluded people over 74 years of age.
99
 The number of people 
having gambling problems in 1998 remained similar according to the study 
from 2010, where approximately 2 percent of the gambling population are 
deemed to have gambling problems.
100
 However, it is interesting to note that 
gambling is more common amongst men compared to women. Gambling is 
especially common for men in the age group 18-24 and it is in this group 
where we find the highest frequency of problem gamblers. The same group 
has the highest frequency (18 percent)  of gambling on foreign provider 
sites during the year.
 101
   
5.3  Current gambling legislation 
The Lottery Act is the main legislation for all gambling activity in Sweden 
whereas the Casino Act regulates Sweden’s casinos. The legislation’s 
objective is to protect consumers, minimize criminality, negative social and 
economical effects and to control the financial surplus.
102
The Lottery act 
defines lottery as when a participant, with or without a wager, can obtain 
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winnings to a higher value than most of the other participants. The term 
“lottery” includes most known gambling types such as sports betting, poker 
and bingo.
103
 In the proposition, to the Lottery Act, betting is regarded as a 
form of agreement between parties with the example: Wagering with an 
amount of money on a certain outcome of an event.
104
 The broad definition 
of the term lottery consequently leads to that all games and gambling where 
chance plays a predominant role will fall within the scope of the Lottery 
Act. However, chance is not the only criteria and the general nature of the 
activity must be regarded.
105
Interesting in this context is the Grebbestad-
case, where the Supreme Court ruled that poker was deemed to be more 
depending on skill than chance.
106
  
 
The Lottery Act only allows operators, whom have received permission by 
the state, to provide gambling services.
107
 Lotteriinspektionen is responsible 
for licenses and ensuring that the Swedish gambling market is legitimate, 
safe and trustworthy.
108
 To organize a lottery without permission is 
prohibited by law. The LA also says that it is a criminal offence to promote 
lotteries from abroad.
109
 The Swedish regulated market consists of five 
providers, Svenska Spel, Folkspel, ATG, Postkodlotteriet and 
Kombilotteriet.
110
 Private providers are in principle excluded from the 
market with a few exceptions in form of restaurant casinos, dealers for 
Svenska Spel and ATG whom are entitled to the revenue raised from their 
businesses. ATG has an exclusivity agreement on horse betting, which is 
regulated in the LA, an agreement between the state and the horse sport and a 
permit from the government. Svenska Spel, which is owned by the state, has an 
exclusivity agreement for gambling machines, casinos (through the CA), Sports 
                                                 
103
 SFS 1994:100 § 3, Lotterilagen.  
104
 Prop. 1993/94:182, Ny lotterilag, s. 54. 
105
 Plogell, Sports Betting Regulation in Sweden  p.  767. 
106
 HD Case B 2760-09, Grebbestad. 
107
 SFS 1994:100 § 9, Lotterilagen. 
108
 Lotteriinspektionen, http://www.lotteriinspektionen.se/sv/Om-oss/ 
109
 SFS 1994:100 §§ 38 and 54, Lotterilagen. 
110
 Riksrevisionen, RiR 2012:15, Staten på spelmarknaden – når man målen?,  p. 19. 
 37 
betting and online poker. Svenska Spel also has lotteries. Folkspel have 
exclusivity on bingo and also have lotteries.111 The combined turnover for the 
regulated Swedish market was around 30 billion SEK for the first three 
quarters of 2012, which is an overall increase with 77 million SEK 
compared to 2011.
112
 The total turnover 2011 was estimated to be almost 42 
billion SEK.
113
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
However, as mentioned above many gambling providers offer their services 
across borders, which is also the case in Sweden. This unregulated market 
consists of foreign providers offering products, mainly online poker and 
sports betting, to Swedish citizens without the required permission over the 
internet. The products offered by these providers often have a higher 
payback ratio and a higher risk than those offered by the regulated 
providers. There is also a Sweden-based illegal gambling activity such as 
betting machines and poker clubs.
114
  
 
Since 1991, the Swedish National Institute of Public Health has had the 
government’s responsibility to develop measures to reduce excessive 
gambling and related negative social effects.
 
The grant to achieve this has 
been increased from €0.5 million in 1999 to €3 million for 2012. Svenska 
Spel also devotes €1.2 million annually. In this context it should be noted 
that Svenska Spel’s annual profit is approximately $450-550 million.115  
5.4 Future legislation 
The Swedish Government decided to overlook the Swedish Gambling 
legislation in 2004.
116
 The reason was that the current legislation came in to 
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force before the online revolution, resulting in a different market.
117
 The 
objective of a new legislation remains the same as in the current legislation 
and the only way to achieve the objections is through regulation. The 
revenue raised from gambling activities should benefit the public according 
to current legislation. However, the report suggests that it may not be 
possible to guarantee that all of the revenue should benefit the public in the 
future. The report states that it may be that, due to the market, technology or 
legal developments, it is a necessity to open up the gambling market in 
terms of private interests.
118
 The report states three different options to 
regulate online foreign gambling services:  
 
a) prohibit gambling on foreign sites for Swedish residents 
b) prohibit foreign operators to provide services to Swedish residents  
c) prohibit services which makes it possible to access these sites 
(internet providers and electronic wallets).
 
 
 
Out of the three options only the option (b) was deemed suitable, with an 
unsanctioned prohibition against foreign providers combined with a wider 
definition of what constitutes a promotion of commercial interets.
119
  
 
In the Government report from 2008, the three options for a future 
legislation had changed to the following: 
 
a) Maintain the current legislation and restrict it 
b) Open up online gambling for private providers 
c) Open up a certain gambling type for private providers. 
 
According to the report, the first option is possible as there is no 
requirement from the European Community law to open up the market. The 
second option was ruled out as certain types of online gambling, as 
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interactive games as poker, are said to be the most addictive and therefore 
would need strict control. The third option was also deemed possible as the 
most problematic gambling types would not be licensed.
120
The report also 
states that the possibility to block IP-addresses and domain names serves as 
an important aspect of pursuing the purpose of a potential new legislation. 
However, the report also mentions the possibilities for the consumer or the 
provider to work around these blocks.
121
 There is concern whether this 
measure would constitute a breach to the freedom of speech. As of now, 
only child pornography related sites are allowed to be blocked. There has 
been a proposal similar to this when attempting to limit file sharing. This 
proposal was rejected as the measure was deemed to be out of proportion 
and especially in the light of the importance Internet has for society. 
122
 
 
The Government reports from 2006 and 2008 have yet to result in any 
legislative change. Riksrevisionen state in their report from 2012 that the 
current Swedish gambling legislation does not effectively pursue to meet the 
objectives set. Part of the criticism is aimed towards Svenska Spel, who are 
not considered to be thorough enough in the pursuit of reducing gambling 
addiction. With Svenska Spel being a State-controlled company, their 
measures taken should preferably be in the frontline of the industry. 
However, the report says that unregulated providers are performing much of 
these desirable measures, thus questioning the set objective by Svenska 
Spel. Svenska Spel has limited their responsibility to identification of and 
contact with problem gamblers. Svenska Spel has also stated that an 
important part of their strategy is to retake lost market shares. This should 
be done by improving their products, for example by introducing a mobile 
version, which has been said to impose a bigger risk in regard to gambling 
addiction.
123
  Riksrevisionen also questioned Svenska Spel’s intensive 
marketing and in this context, it is interesting to note that there is an intense 
competition between Svenska Spel and the non-profit organizations when it 
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comes to lotteries. It could be questioned whether pursuing market shares 
from other legal providers could be seen as systematic and consistent, 
especially since the marketing has been questioned in Marketing Court.
124
 
The report also points out the fact that there is legislation concerning 
alcohol commercials while there is none for the gambling market, which 
leads to unclear and questionable commercials and advertising. If the rules 
on marketing are clarified, Riksrevisionen says that the risks of the Swedish 
gambling legislation not being coherent with EU law may be reduced.
125
 
 
Another source of criticism is aimed towards the government for not being 
clear enough in directing Svenska Spel. Riksrevisionen claims there is an 
absence of knowledge of the subject and that the government has failed to 
evaluate Svenska Spel’s work in regard to problem gambling prevention and 
marketing. Riksrevisionen also criticized the license procedure as there are 
no clear criteria which the licensees have to meet in order to renew a 
license. This procedure cannot be seen as transparent neither predictable, 
which ultimately prevents future providers from entering the market.
126
  
 
The Swedish government, has in a report, published on December 28
th
 2012, 
partially acknowledged Riksrevisionens criticism. Regarding reduction of 
gambling addiction and excessive gambling the government recognizes the 
lack of a clear national and local responsibility. The government also refers 
to the report by the Swedish National Institute of Public Health and says that 
further action is needed to reduce gambling addiction. Regarding the 
criticism aimed towards directing Svenska Spel, the government 
acknowledges the importance of evaluation, however, this is not the 
government’s responsibility but Svenska Spel’s.127 The government also 
states, by referring to case law, that although Svenska Spel has strong 
responsibility when employing marketing campaigns in terms of 
moderation, the marketing has to exist to ensure that the objective of 
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channelling gambling to Svenska Spel’s services is achievable.128 In the 
budget proposition from earlier this year, the government has said that the 
marketing employed should have a social responsibility approach and avoid 
being perceived as intrusive.
129
 In conclusion, the government states that 
there is a need for a review of parts of the current legislation and that a 
proposal from the report of 2008 is scheduled to achieve a well functioning 
regulation of the gambling market.
130
  
 
As mentioned above only certain operators are allowed to provide gambling 
services in Sweden. Some of these providers are private. In the light of the non-
discrimination principle this would constitute a clear breach, since foreign 
gambling providers are not allowed to provide their services. However, as these 
private interests are mostly only providing a service for Svenska Spel and ATG 
they are not in direct competition to the foreign providers. The only exceptions 
are the restaurant casinos, which have clear wager and winning limits and can 
therefore be seen as rather insignificant. The legislation does not have any 
condition of nationality or residency and therefore it cannot be seen as 
discriminating.131 Non-profit organizations, unlike foreign providers,  have 
been given privileges on the Swedish gambling market. This can be justified, if 
it is in the public interest. However, it has been shown that several of these 
licensed non-profit organizations may be commerical, for example 
PostkodLotteriet which is owned by a private company with its registered seat 
in the Netherlands. The non-profit organization is in fact driven by a 
commercial company with the interest of maximizing its profit.132  
 
 
 
                                                 
128
 Skrivelse 2012/13:52, Riksrevisionens rapport om statens roll på spelmarknaden, p. 8, 
see also RÅ 2004 ref. 95, Wärmdö Krog.  
129
 Prop. 2012/13:1 Utgiftsområde 17, Tillsyn över spelmarknaden, p. 206. 
130
 Skrivelse 2012/13:52, Riksrevisionens rapport om statens roll på spelmarknaden, p. 8, 
see also,Prop. 2012/13:1 Utgiftsområde 17, Tillsyn över spelmarknaden, p. 206. 
131
 Hettne, Statens roll på den svenska spelmarknaden – ett EU-perspektiv, p. 58. 
132
 Hettne, Statens roll på den svenska spelmarknaden – ett EU-perspektiv, p. 59-60. 
 42 
6 Swedish Case Study 
In this section I will present four cases which question the Swedish 
gambling regulation’s coherence with the fundamental rights on freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services. 
6.1 Case Study Wärmdö krog: RÅ 2004 ref. 95 
Wärmdö Krog AB (the company) appealed previous ruling by the Lottery 
Inspection, which imposed fines on the company if they would continue to 
provide gambling services to SSP Overseas Betting Limited (SSP), on the 
grounds that 38 § LA was a hindrance to the freedom to provide services. 
The company did not question the objectives of the Swedish gambling 
legislation to be coherent with EU-law. However, the company claimed that 
the practical use did not serve to meet these purposes. The company argued 
that Svenska Spel and ATG encouraged consumers to engage in gambling 
activities, while they were protected by the State at the same time.
133
 
6.1.1 Ruling 
The Supreme Administrative Court shared the company’s views in regard to 
the regulated market promoting gambling activities amongst consumers. 
However, the Court referred to the ECJ rulings, mentioned above, stating 
that it was up to the national Courts to ensure that the national legislation 
served its purpose and was in coherence with the proportionality principle. 
The Court said that the financial benefits from gambling for the general 
public is not a justification to hindrance of the freedoms, in itself, but rather 
a contributing positive effect. National Legislation should reduce the 
gambling possibilities and control the gambling market in a cohesive and 
systematical way. The Court also said that it was not reasonable to prohibit 
the regulated market from advertising to the public due to the apparent large 
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demand for gambling services.  The Court assumed the regulated market to 
provide better consumer protection and less risk for fraud than the 
unregulated market. In conclusion, although the marketing campaigns by the 
regulated providers were intense at times and could be deemed to “incite 
and encourage” it was not enough to constitute a breach.134 
 
The ruling has received criticism. The lack of harmonization and special 
character of gambling have given the Member State discretion in their choice of 
regulation. However, this does not exclude Member States from legislating 
regulation that is not necessary or not proportionate. The Supreme 
Administrative Court should therefore have performed a proportionality test 
to see if the national legislation in a cohesive and systematical way 
contributes to the goals set, which they failed to do according to some 
critics. Other critics go even further by saying that the Supreme Administrative 
Court never tested whether the hindrance to freedom to provide services and 
establishments had actual grounds. They also conclude that the Supreme 
Administrative Court has overlooked these fundamental principles and 
given the State unrestricted possibilities to control the gambling market in 
Sweden.
135
  
6.2 Case Study Ladbrokes: RÅ 2005 ref. 54 
This case is about the UK gambling service provider Ladbrokes who applied 
for permission to provide gambling services on the Swedish Market, by 
establishing betting shops and internet services. They based their application 
on the ECJ ruling in the Gambelli case. The application was denied on the 
grounds that the gambling market in Sweden predominantly belongs to the 
state, social movements and the horse sport.  The income generated from 
gambling should be directed to the public. Ladbrokes claimed that the 
Swedish State’s approach to gambling was to provide state income and not 
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to minimize the risks of excessive gambling or gambling addiction. 
Ladbrokes claim that the intense marketing from the regulated providers and 
that only a fraction of the raised revenue was used to prevent and treat 
problem gambling are incoherent with objectives of the legislation.
136
 
6.2.1 Ruling 
The Supreme Administrative Court mostly referred in this case to the ruling 
in the Wärmdö case, see above. Ladbrokes questioned the legality of the 
decision to refuse them a license in Sweden. According to the Supreme 
Administrative Court the reason of the denied license may be misleading 
and incomplete in the light of the objectives within the legislation and the 
ruling in the Wärmdö case. However, the outcome of the decision is in 
coherence with both the LA and EU case law.  The Court therefore decided 
that the decision not to grant Ladbrokes a license should stand even though 
the reasoning was not adequate.
137
  
6.3 Case Study Betsson: RÅ 2007 note 72 
Betsson AB applied for a license to provide gambling services in 
accordance with the LA and CA. The application was denied on the basis 
that is was not coherent to the objectives of the Swedish gambling 
legislation. To achieve the given goals it has been decided to limit the 
competition on the gambling market. Betsson questioned the decision as 
they claimed that the State’s actions are not driven in the light of the 
objectives of the LA and instead focus on maximizing state income and 
generating a percentage to Swedish sports.  Betsson maintained the same 
stance as Ladbrokes, see case above, while adding that the State recently 
granted Svenska Spel a license to provide online poker, despite the fact that 
the Swedish National Institute of Public Health and the Lottery Inspection 
had rejected the idea of introducing licenses in online poker.
138
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6.3.1 Ruling 
The Supreme Administrative Court stated that it could be questioned 
whether the sometimes intense marketing by the regulated providers, was 
appropriate to attain the objective of the legislation. However, the Court 
reiterated their previous stance by saying that the questionability is not 
strong enough to prove that the legislation’s true objective is to ensure state 
income. The Court said that the measures taken therefore should be seen as 
proportionate and referred to the Placanica case. The Court says that the 
gambling legislation is coherent with European Community law and that 
there was no case law saying otherwise.  The Court denied the request for a 
preliminary ruling from the ECJ and ruled in favor of the state.
139
 
6.4 Case study Sjöberg och Gerdin:  B 3559-11  
This case is about two major daily newspapers, Aftonbladet and Expressen, 
publishing advertisements for foreign gambling providers, Expekt, Unibet, 
Ladbrokes and CentreBet, to the Swedish public during November 2003 to 
August 2004. The Chief Editor’s, of the respective newspaper, Otto Sjöberg 
and Anders Gerdin were indicted for promoting foreign gambling providers 
with a commercial purpose. The District Court’s decision to fine the chief 
editors was overturned by the Court of Appeals, based on the preliminary 
ruling from the ECJ. 
140
The case was granted a certiorari by the Supreme 
Administrative Court on the 2 November 2011. The Supreme 
Administrative Court came to the same conclusion, as the Court of appeals, 
and ruled in favor of Sjöberg and Gerdin on 21 December 2012. 
141
  
6.4.1 Ruling 
The ECJ stated that effect of paragraph 38 LA, which prohibits the 
promotion of gambling, is to prevent Swedish consumers from engaging in 
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gambling with foreign gambling service providers. This is a clear restriction 
for Swedish residents as well as providers established in another Member 
State. The ECJ thereafter examined whether the restriction can be justified 
on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. EJC referred to 
Placanica and Liga Portuguesa where the overriding reason of the general 
interest was recognized. The Court yet again said that it is up to each 
Member State to determine what is required to protect the interest in 
question. The Member States are free to set the objectives of their gambling 
policy. This objection must fulfill the conditions laid down in case-law in 
regard to proportionality. The Court then continued to examine whether 
paragraph 38§ is suitable for achieving the legitimate objective or objectives 
set by Sweden and if it goes beyond what is deemed necessary.
142
 
The Swedish gambling regulation was, in principle, deemed to be 
acceptable, prohibiting advertisement of foreign providers and proportional 
to the  set objectives. However, the Court raised concerns regarding the 
criminal sanctions which only penalized the promotion of foreign providers 
and not unregulated providers within Sweden.
143
  
The Supreme Administrative Court said, in line with the Court of Appeals, 
that there was no hindrance in applying the prohibition to promote foreign 
providers. However, the Court decided that the criminal sanction was 
discriminatory according to EU law and therefore the sanctions for Sjöberg 
and Gerdin were not applicable. This was partially based on a historical and 
systematical approach. The promotion of unregulated Swedish gambling 
providers and the promotion of foreign gambling providers have been seen 
as separate criminal offences.
144
 The Court argued that if the published 
advertising promoted unregulated Swedish gambling providers the same 
criminal offence could not be applied with the result of a more lenient 
sanction than Sjöberg and Gerdin could receive.
145
 
                                                 
142
 Joined Cases C-447/08 and C-448/08, Sjöberg Gerdin, paras. 33-39. 
143
 Joined Cases C-447/08 and C-448/08, Sjöberg Gerdin, para. 57. 
144
 B 3559-11, Sjöberg Gerdin, note 26 -30, see also SFS 1939:207, Lotteriförordningen. 
145
 B 3559-11, Sjöberg Gerdin, note 36. 
 47 
Riksrevisionen questioned whether the EJC accepted the Swedish gambling 
legislation, suggesting that there was never an examination whether the 
legislation fulfilled the set criteria.
146
 This statement has received criticism 
as it is clear that the legislation is accepted by the ECJ as the monopoly is 
deemed necessary and proportionate in relation to its purpose. The critics 
say that the report by Riksrevisionen has questioned clear Swedish case law 
on unfounded grounds. The aforementioned ruling is based on a technicality 
which does not constitute a reason for questioning the Swedish legislation’s 
coherence to EU law.
147
  
The judgment by the ECJ has received criticism for using an outdated 
perception of gambling by referring back to Schindler. The ECJ has also 
failed to instruct the Swedish Court to examine the effect paragraph 54 may 
have on the online gambling market and economy as a whole. With the 
ruling overlooking the scope of a national newspapers which is not limited 
to national territory the online gambling markets suffer from not reaching 
their customers. The consequence may be that it might harm the lawful 
online gambling industry in a time when the European economy is in a 
terrible state.  The gambling industry has seen constant employment growth 
in Europe since 2000 and although the gambling business singlehandedly 
cannot turn the crisis around, it can at least provide assistance. This is 
something the governments around Europe have realized. Italy, as an 
example, enforced taxes on gambling providers for around €150 million last 
year.
148
  
 
The Swedish state however sees the revenue raised from gambling as an 
incidental benefit. When the ECJ ruled in the Sjöberg and Gerdin case they 
referred to the similarities to Liga Portuguesa.  Both states have a system 
where exclusive rights are given to organizations which are subject to strict 
control. There were however differences as the revenue raised in Portugal 
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directly went to social purposes where as in Sweden the revenue was 
directed to the state, with the previous direct link to sport organizations 
being cut. However, the ECJ did not put any emphasis on how the revenue 
was distributed.
149
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7 Regulatory Case Study -  The 
Danish Gambling act 2010 
As the previous chapters have shown, the ECJ does not seem to be able to 
provide a solution to the problem of gambling legislation. This has led to 
Member States taking different approaches, which is also evident in 
Scandinavia. Norway and Finland have strengthened their monopolies, 
while Denmark has introduced a license system
150
. In this chapter I will 
present the Danish gambling legislation. This will enable a discussion, 
whether the Danish approach is a possible route for Sweden to take on in the 
analysis. 
7.1 Background 
In 2010, the Danish Government decided to proceed with a reform of the 
existing Gambling regulation with the so-called “new act”. The act came 
into force from January 1
st
 2012.
151
Until the new legislation was introduced, 
the State monopoly and only provider, Danske Spil A/S, mainly governed 
gambling. During this time, no other providers were allowed to promote any 
of their gambling services on Danish territory. However, cross-border 
gambling service providers marketed their services anyway and were by 
definition providing illegal gambling services.
152
  
 
The comments to the act state that the evolution of internet has had a major 
influence on the development of the gambling market and the availability 
that the internet provides meant that Danish players, with a continuous 
growth, are choosing foreign providers.  This development is from a public 
order view unfavorable as gambling, without intense control and regulation 
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result in negative effects on society in terms of criminality and gambling 
addiction. Therefore, as the revenue raised from gambling declines, and thus 
less finances are directed to charity, and as the Danish legislation is not 
deemed suitable in the pursue to reach the objectives set, it is a necessity to 
modernize gambling legislation.
153
 
 
7.2 New gambling legislation 
The new Act came into force January 1
st
 2012 and its first paragraph states 
that the purpose of the legislation is through regulation and control aim to: 
1) Keep gambling activities at a moderate level 
2) protect young people or other vulnerable groups from being 
exploited by gambling or developing gambling addiction 
3) ensure  that provided gambling services are safe, responsible and 
transparent 
4) ensure public order and hinder gambling with links to criminality. 
The following paragraphs in the first chapter describe that all gambling 
within Danish territory, online as well as offline, is prohibited, regardless of 
where the provider is based, unless a license is provided by the relevant 
authority.
154
 In the following chapter, the legislation has clearly attempted to 
define what constitutes the different types of gambling according to Danish 
law. Chapter three lists all types of gambling which are available to offer 
gambling services on the Danish territory. However, there are a few 
exceptions on certain gambling types which are still reserved for Danske 
Spil A/S like horse racing and various types of lotteries. Chapter four states 
conditions on who can obtain a license to offer gambling services in 
Denmark. One of the most important conditions is that to be granted a 
license the applicant should be established in Denmark or in another EU or 
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EAA country, unless there is a representative from the applicant who has 
been approved by the Danish Authorities.  The successful applicant is also 
subject to pay an application fee and to pay an annual license fee depending 
on the taxable income raised by the provider during the calendar year.
155
 
Paragraph 65 allows that the stakes and winnings from illegal providers as 
well as transmission of information about an illegal game system to be 
blocked. Spillemyndingheten, which is in charge of controlling the Danish 
gambling market, issues statements when such sites are blocked.
156
  
 
Despite efforts by the legislator, it has been argued that the act still violates 
Article 56 and other fundamental principles by the lack of reducing 
gambling opportunities, in the act as well as the preparatory works, in a 
consistent and systematic manner as described in Placanica. The exclusion 
of lotteries and horse racing from what providers can offer is a breach of 
Article 56. Another source of criticism has been aimed towards the blocking 
of illegal gambling sites, which constitutes a violation of the freedom of 
expression, a fundamental EU law and human rights principle.
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8 Analysis 
Gambling is an activity which has existed since ancient times with the 
desire of having more wealth playing a major part. The problem with 
gambling is that there is chance you will lose what you stake, which can in 
its turn lead to a need to gamble again to win back what has been lost. The 
unwritten law amongst gamblers is never to bet with money you cannot 
afford to lose and if you do lose, do not try to win it back by continuing to 
gamble. Nevertheless, these rules are constantly broken as often the desire 
of having more is greater than the will of refraining from gambling, also 
known as a gambling addiction or problem gambling. Problem gambling 
can lead to multiple negative side effects not only for the individual 
engaging in gambling but also for the gambler’s family and in the end also 
for society. There are also concerns that gambling contributes to criminality 
and fraud. The Asian sports market has been heavily affected by match 
fixing by players, teams and even authorities through fraudulent behavior 
from criminal networks. This development has spread to Europe with proof 
of several sport events being fixed and thus benefitting criminal network. 
The specific nature of gambling together with apparent links to criminality 
is mainly why gambling causes a fierce debate around the world in how to 
best contain, control and regulate gambling. However, history prevails that 
the problem does not go away simply by prohibiting the activity, as 
gambling services has been provided despite any restrictive or prohibiting 
legislation to date. So what is the best way to tackle the problems connected 
to gambling?  
 
The EU has from an early point taken the approach that gambling is 
something to which each Member State, due to the moral, religious or 
cultural aspects has to decide the appropriate measures to perform in regard 
to what the Member States pursues to protect. Therefore there is no 
harmonization within the EU, which has led to a patchwork of regulations 
on the matter of gambling and especially regarding online gambling. 
 53 
However, despite the fact that Member States have been given discretion on 
how to regulate gambling, the legislation still has to adhere to fundamental 
principles of EU law if the activity may be seen as an economic activity. In 
Schindler the Court laid down that gambling constitutes an economic 
activity, which invokes the freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services which serve to reach the EU objective of a free internal 
market. The non-discriminative and proportionality principles serve as tools 
to limit restrictions to these freedoms. However, the ECJ said that the 
specific nature of gambling enables Member States to justify a restriction in 
regard to these freedoms. What is interesting from this early case is that the 
Court saw that the objective of the legislation in that the revenue raised from 
gambling should be distributed to the public to be a ground for justification 
despite the fact that it might not be perceived as objective. I agree with the 
view of the EJC on this decision based on the fact that gambling across 
borders at the time was relativity insignificant. The internet revolution had 
yet to influence the gambling sphere and from that point of view it is not 
possible to request that the ECJ should foresee the extreme growth of cross 
border gambling which the internet provides. 
 
When the ECJ ruled in Zenatti the Court made the important statement that 
the financing by the public as the primary objective of a legislation could be 
a ground for a justification, thus leaving the more lenient ruling in Schindler 
behind. The ECJ suggests that the financing of the public could only be an 
incidental consequence. This could be considered as a break through as 
monopolies now had to focus their objectives more towards the actual 
problems related to gambling, rather than making revenue to the state. 
However, one could debate whether this simply has had the effect that the 
objective of a state monopoly slightly changes. More focus is taken on the 
protection of consumers, which would be an accepted objective, while still 
having the possibility to raise revenue to the state.  
 
The Court took it a bit further in Gambelli by stating that the measures taken 
must stand in proportion and must be applied in a non-discriminatory way. 
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The ECJ also sharpened the tone in regard to state monopolies which incites 
and encourages gambling which i.e. the Italian State was considered to do. 
The ECJ thus inhibits Member States to use the public order argument in 
order to justify restrictive measures, as focus is now turned whether the 
restriction stands in proportion to its objective. 
 
The more stringent reasoning continues in Placanica by the ECJ stating that 
if a Member State uses a multiple-license system the criteria for a restrictive 
measure to be deemed proportionate  are higher. The ECJ stance employed 
in Gambelli and Placanica contributed to strengthening the case for private 
online gaming operators. I can understand why the state monopolies around 
Europe were concerned regarding the seemingly unstoppable growth of 
online gambling. I do believe the market was on the verge of being opened 
up, especially as the Commission mentioned that regulation might be 
inevitable to refrain from causing significant problems to Internal Market.  
 
However, the ECJ rather quickly safeguarded the Member State’s 
monopolies with their ruling in Liga Portuguesa. The Court goes back to 
previous case law by granting Member States discretion due to the specific 
nature of gambling. The Court takes on an anti-competition approach when 
it comes to gambling as it cannot be compared to other products or services, 
due to the business thriving on players losing more money than they win. I 
agree to a certain extent with these sentiments as gambling is really 
incomparable with any other activity. However, there are certain parallels 
that can be drawn to the fact that buying stock could be seen as a type of 
gambling. You are making assumptions, read “guessing”, whether the stock 
will go up or down based on what the market and “experts” say. One could 
ask one self, from an objective point of view, what is the difference? 
Another source of criticism could be aimed at the fact that there are 
providers who not depend on players losing more than they are winning.  
This is the example of gambling service provider Betfair, which serves to 
provide gambling opportunities between consumers on an exchange, where 
Betfair are taking a commission when an agreement between two parties is 
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struck. Nevertheless, this was overlooked in Liga Portuguesa. Focus was 
rather taken on the grounds for making restrictions justified in the light of 
EU law, by stating that the fight against crime and fraud may constitute an 
example of an overriding reason in the public interest.  The principle of 
mutual recognition which normally permeates the discussion on how to 
secure the free movement of services and products was not even considered. 
In fact, the principle was said not to relate to gambling due to its specific 
nature.   I think this sends out a dubious message as gambling has been 
considered an economic activity and if one Member State has recognized a 
provider as legitimate it should be recognized throughout the EU. However, 
the decision to disregard the principle has also positive aspects as the “race 
to the bottom” approach might be phased out as providers have to apply for 
a license in each Member State. Thus, the more lenient legislations, where a 
provider is granted a license will not automatically lead to a license in 
another Member State.  
 
In Betfair it was the first time that the ECJ discussed the procedure of 
offering licenses. The ECJ ruled that if one-license system is used, without 
tender competition, it has to be given to a public provider or a private 
provider subjected to strict control. It is clear that the EJC has put a lot of 
emphasis on the importance of transparency and that it only under very 
specific circumstances is it justifiable to derogate. The principle of  
Mutual recognition was clearly rejected again and it seems as when it comes 
to gambling there is no room for that principle whatsoever 
 
The Markus Stoß case is interesting as it deals with a gambling legislation 
which has liberalized parts of their monopoly. Again, the ECJ highlighted 
the discretion Member States have when it comes to gambling and said that 
the applied solution can be justified if it is in proportion to the objectives 
set.  I find it very questionable to liberalize gambling types which have been 
proven to have a highly more addictive rate. It clearly cannot serve the 
objective to reduce gambling addiction and gambling opportunities. I do 
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believe the aforementioned solution has key advantages as the most 
addictive gambling types could be kept monopolized.  
 
The more lenient approach taken by the ECJ continues in Garkalns where 
the Latvian Authorities used restrictive measures which could be seen as 
discriminatory and not announced in due time. What was interesting in this 
case is that the ECJ said that if a restriction is to be considered to be 
justified it is subject to strict conditions. What this means is however rather 
unclear. This ultimately leads to a status quo for both legislators and 
providers.  
 
The last case, OPAP, I chose to present is highly relevant to the discussion I 
will take on next as it relates to a monopoly which has a clear objective to 
reduce gambling opportunities yet at the same time employs a rather intense 
marketing approach. To be able to serve as an alternative to the foreign 
providers the monopoly must let the public know about its services. 
However, there is a thin line regarding when the marketing becomes too 
intense.  In this case the ECJ, with Advocate General Mazak leading the 
line, considered the Greek approach to be out of proportion and that the true 
objective was not to limit gambling rather to increase it.  
8.1 Swedish legislation in the light of EU 
Gambling has always been a source for debate in Sweden, with the 
predicament on how to regulate an activity, which on the one hand could 
finance a war yet at the same time may cause harm to society by its specific 
nature. When the current gambling legislation came, there was no online 
gambling and gambling was truly a national matter, with few exceptions. 
Gambling took place over the counter and no one could have imagined the 
development which gambling has taken in the last decade. However, now 
the legislator has been caught off-guard by this explosion of opportunities to 
gamble. The legislation is clearly outdated and lacks adapted definition on 
what gambling is. The current solution by placing all kinds of gambling in 
 57 
to “lottery” is a rather confusing description. The ruling by the Supreme 
Court in the poker case points at an apparent need for a remake on how to 
define gambling.  
 
In the case law I have presented one can see a red line throughout the 
judgments by the Court stating the legislation to be consistent with EU law. 
The Court had until Sjöberg and Gerdin not requested a preliminary ruling 
from the ECJ, which has been highly criticised with concerns to the 
legislation’s compatibility with EU law. In Wärmdökrog the Court decided 
that legislation served its purpose and that it was proportionate in reference 
to current ECJ rulings. The Court did, however, say that the marketing 
employed by regulated providers were intense, but that it was not enough to 
constitute a breach.  I share the critics’ point of view in that the Court 
should have preformed a more thorough proportionality test and more 
importantly asked for a preliminary ruling in regard to the necessary 
measures taken.  The Court yet again refused to request a preliminary 
hearing in Ladbrokes, where the provider claimed that the true objective of 
Swedish legislation was to provide revenue for the state.  The Court 
interestingly acknowledged the fact that the reasoning behind the denied 
license may had been misleading and incomplete but in the end it was the 
right decision as it was coherent with both the LA and EU case law. This is 
from my opinion very strange reasoning as the intense marketing can be 
seen as an indication that the measures go beyond what is necessary. I agree 
with Ladbrokes that if less restrictive measures can lead to the same result 
these should be used. Svenska Spel has not, see statistics section 5.2, been 
able to reduce the number of problem gamblers thus is not fulfilling its 
objective. The preparatory works from 2006 and 2008 also suggest that the 
Swedish legislation does not do enough to prevent problem gambling. 
 
With the Gambelli ruling the ECJ had laid down that the revenue raised only 
could be a positive side effect of a monopoly and not primary objective. I 
am quite sure that if the preliminary ruling had been requested, in the light 
of the more stringent approach, the claims by Ladbrokes would have had a 
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good chance of being accepted. The Court ruled once again in Betsson that 
the doubt whether the true objective of the legislation was to provide state 
income was deemed to not be strong enough. The Court referred to 
Placanica by saying that the measures taken stood in proportion and 
therefore were justified.  
 
Whether the Swedish Monopoly could have been seen as unjustified after 
Gambelli and Placanica will remain unanswered as the ECJ never had the 
chance. However, when the Court decided to request a preliminary ruling 
the ECJ was given a golden opportunity to do so in Sjöberg and Gerdin. The 
Court stated that the Swedish gambling regulation was, in principle, deemed 
to be acceptable and prohibiting advertisement of foreign providers is 
proportional to the objective set. As Riksrevisionen points out one can 
question how thorough the ECJ were when examining whether the objective 
of the Swedish legislation was fulfilled and rather focusing on issue of 
paragraphs 38 and 54, which were discriminatory. The fact that the EJC fails 
to recognize the scope that newspapers have might harm the online 
gambling industry in a time where not many industries are seeing growth, 
rather the opposite with the European economy being in poor state. It is 
interesting to see that gambling with all its apparent flaws and specific 
nature is often turned to when something needs financing.  
 
Is it possible to question the Swedish legislation’s compatibility with EU 
law despite the ECJ ruling in Sjöberg and Gerdin?  First of all only a few 
providers are allowed to provide gambling services, with some of these 
providers being private and not owned by the state. I agree with 
Riksrevisionen sentiments that there is no discrimination regarding the fact 
that some private companies are allowed to engage in the market while 
others are not. These providers only share a small market share and the 
competition can be disregarded. However, granting licenses to non-profit 
organizations, which in reality may be commercial, is in my opinion 
something that needs to be scrutinized. Postkodlotteriet amasses enormous 
 59 
amounts of revenue and since this revenue is not solely directed to social 
benefit, one could question why a license as been provided in the first place. 
 
Another interesting approach is marketing. According to Placanica the 
marketing from monopolies cannot go beyond what is necessary in directing 
consumers to controlled gambling services and rather employ a marketing 
policy with the aim to expand market shares on a global level. 
Postkodlotteriet is in my opinion pursuing a very intense marketing policy 
by trying to take market shares from other regulated providers on the 
market, like Svenska Spel, which was questioned in Swedish Marketing 
Court. This competition cannot be said to meet the objectives of the 
legislation; to reduce gambling opportunities and gambling addiction.  This 
is not a totally different situation from what was brought up in Betfair where 
the national Court used a strict interpretation of the conditions set in 
paragraph 59 in the ECJ judgment. It could be questioned whether Svenska 
Spel and other regulated providers really are following these conditions.  
Riksrevisionen criticized the fact that there is not enough guidance or follow 
up on Svenska Spel’s performance. Since several of the non-profit 
organizations would be difficult to categorize it is in my opinion unlikely 
that neither Svenska Spel or the non-profit organizations would meet these 
conditions. The Swedish government seems to have taken steps in a review 
of the legislation as they share Riksrevisionen’s opinions to a large extent 
and also see problems with the current legislation. Further problems with 
the legislations are exposed in the recent judgment of the chief editors 
Sjöberg and Gerdin who had clearly, and most likely intentionally, 
committed a criminal offence by promoting foreign providers. As the Court 
considered the criminal sanction to be discriminative, it could not impose 
criminal sanctions on the chief editors. This has in my opinion created legal 
uncertainty, as the ruling basically says that there is no criminal sanction 
connected to promoting illegal providers, at least in this case. How should 
the judgment be interpreted?  If you ask the editors at Aftonbladet and 
Expressen, and other sites for that matter, I am sure that they are extremely 
happy with this ruling as it can increase their revenue significantly. The 
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relatively critical approach from the government together with the recent 
Supreme Court’s ruling would suggest that a change is not too far away.   
 
8.2 Possible future legislation in the light of 
Denmarks new legislation 
Denmark was the first Scandinavian country to liberalize its gambling 
Monopoly. Before the new act there were many similarities between the 
Swedish and the Danish legislation. Denmark also faced the same problems 
regarding foreign providers reaching the Danish market via the internet. The 
availability of the internet was one of the key reasons why Denmark 
changed opinion. The saying “Keep your friends close, but your enemies 
closer” is very applicable to this situation. The business may not have been 
wanted, in the eyes of the State, yet it was there and the State could do little 
to change the situation. With the foreign providers gaining a growing 
market share and with the legislation being outdated, it was time for a 
change.  
 
The Danish new act prohibits gambling within the Danish territory unless a 
license is provided, the difference being that, unlike the Swedish system, the 
foreign providers are open to apply if they meet the criteria set in the 
legislation.  The applicant can apply for most types of gambling besides 
lotteries. Successful applicants will need to pay a license fee and taxes to the 
revenue which can be related to their business in Denmark. Providers which 
do not seek a license and still provide services have their site blocked by the 
Danish authorities. The question is now whether the aforementioned 
approach could be something for Sweden. 
 
Sweden has a choice to restrict the current monopoly or to take the 
liberalization route Denmark has taken and adapted to the global 
development as a whole. The Swedish gambling market consists of a 
regulated market but also a large unregulated online market. The Swedish 
 61 
legislation is therefore not adapted to the global development or coherent 
with the fundamental freedoms of the EU. If the freedom to supply services 
and the freedom of establishment are to be negated from the regulation of 
gambling services and gambling service providers, it would create a 
precedent which could prove harmful to the internal market within the EU. 
There negative effects are not limited to the inner market but predominantly 
it is the consumer who is affected by the restriction caused by the dispersed 
approach to gambling. The overhanging risk of new restrictions on how 
gambling should be regulated creates legal uncertainty.  
 
Despite the fact that the ECJ has in principle said that the Swedish 
Monopoly is coherent with EU law there is uncertainty in regard to the 
legislation fulfilling its objectives in a longer perspective. In Liga 
Portuguesa it was stated that the monopoly had the best tools to ensure the 
best consumer protection. However, the approach Denmark has taken does 
not necessarily mean that consumer protection is reduced, it is rather the 
opposite.  To be able to offer gambling services in Denmark the provider 
has to fulfill the conditions and guidelines set in the Danish legislation. 
According to case law restrictive measures should not go beyond what is 
necessary and if the objectives can be met with less restrictive measures that 
option should be applied. This was not the case prior to the introduction of 
the new act in Denmark, as the authorities lacked control of foreign 
providers and therefore the consumers had less protection with more 
restrictive measures. 
 
There are concerns in regard to the Danish legislation as it is not completely 
liberalized, with lotteries being excluded. In Markus Stoβ, the national 
monopoly had also been partially liberalized. This was seen as not being a 
consistent and systematic legislation and therefore a breach to EU law. 
However, only opening up the market for certain types of gambling could 
also be a useful mechanism in controlling consumer protection. This was 
not the case in the Stoβ case as it was the more addictive types which were 
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liberalized. The same can be said about the Danish legislation as lotteries 
are not connected to as much risks, as for example online poker. 
 
The Danish system employs a rather drastic measure to prevent unlicensed 
providers from offering their services on the Danish market. The solution is 
effective yet dubious as it requires a lot of control, which is costly, and it is 
also a clear breach of freedom of speech. As of now it is only child 
pornography related sites which have been blocked by the authorities in 
Sweden. Should such a blocking solution be implemented towards illegal 
gambling sites it could be debated what else justifies a block and if there are 
not other sectors which would be more important to block than gambling. 
However, I think it might be a measure that is necessary and that it 
definitely stands in proportion as there is an alternative available for the 
providers. This benefits legal and more trustworthy providers and thus 
preventing shady providers from being able to offer their services to the 
Danish consumers.  
 
Last but definitely not least, the Danish approach results in tax revenue from 
the gambling sector and in times of crisis it is truly time to deregulate the 
outdate LA. The deregulation of the gambling monopoly might also have an 
effect on the race to the bottom, which might lead providers with strong 
Swedish links, such as Unibet, seeking to establish themselves in Sweden 
instead of for example on Malta. This could lead to more jobs in a growing 
sector which again would lead to more tax revenue for the state. 
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9 Conclusion        
Despite large parts of the world being in an economic crisis, the gambling 
sector continues to grow utilizing the technology available. Especially the 
online gambling sector is growing and that is happening regardless whether 
state regulators and lawmakers like it or not. Gambling was earlier more of a 
national activity as each country could control its territory as they wished. 
However, today gambling is easily accessible for consumers online across 
national borders, which raises uncertainty around its size, scope and legal 
basis.  
 
The lack of harmonization within the EU has contributed to a legal 
uncertainty for its member states, companies and for the consumers. There 
is an apparent need for regulation on an EU level to harmonize and create 
legal certainty and predictability in the gambling market. This is important 
for Member States, consumers and for the industry as whole.  The gambling 
sector raises enormous amounts of revenue but unless legal certainty is 
created it might deteriorate the industry in the long haul and thus cause 
economical harm to the EU. 
 
It is possible to interpret the ECJ ruling in the Sjöberg and Gerdin case in 
several ways. On the one hand the ECJ says, albeit not clearly, that the 
Swedish legislation is not in breach of EU law. On the other hand one can 
criticize the approach Riksrevisionen takes by questioning if the legislation 
is coherent with EU law and rather focus on the question if the criminal 
sanctions were discriminative or not. Only the fact that the recent Supreme 
Court ruling says that the sanctions where discriminative, shows an example 
of the Swedish legislation being outdated and in an apparent need of a 
review. The ruling has created legal uncertainty whether it is prohibited to 
promote foreign gambling providers or not.  
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I suggest that Sweden should follow the route Denmark has taken and 
liberalize its gambling monopoly and issue licenses for foreign providers.  
The legislation should stimulate companies to apply for licenses which 
would increase tax revenue for the state. The recession is still looming over 
Sweden and a liberalized gambling legislation could partially be a way to 
turn things around. The liberalization should with few exceptions be 
complete, with only the most high-risk gambling types to remain under state 
control. The control of foreign sites would most likely be improved as the 
foreign providers would be subject to rules and procedures set by the 
Swedish state.  
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